quote:

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THE former aide-de-camp to the commander of the British taskforce in southern Afghanistan has described the campaign in Helmand province as “a textbook case of how to screw up a counter-insurgency”.

“Having a big old fight is pointless and just making things worse,” said Captain Leo Docherty, of the Scots Guards, who became so disillusioned that he quit the army last month.

“All those people whose homes have been destroyed and sons killed are going to turn against the British,” he said. “It’s a pretty clear equation — if people are losing homes and poppy fields, they will go and fight. I certainly would.

“We’ve been grotesquely clumsy — we’ve said we’ll be different to the Americans who were bombing and strafing villages, then behaved exactly like them.”

“We’ve deviated spectacularly from the original plan,” said Docherty, who was aide-de-camp to Colonel Charlie Knaggs, the commander in Helmand.

“The plan was to secure the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, initiate development projects and enable governance . . . During this time, the insecure northern part of Helmand would be contained: troops would not be ‘sucked in’ to a problem unsolvable by military means alone.”

“The military is just one side of the triangle,” he said. “Where were the Department for International Development and the Foreign Office? “The window was briefly open for our message to be spread, for the civilian population to be informed of our intent and realise that we weren’t there simply to destroy the poppy fields and their livelihoods. I felt at this stage that the Taliban were sitting back and observing us, deciding in their own time how to most effectively hit us.”

“Now the ground has been lost and all we’re doing in places like Sangin is surviving,” said Docherty. “It’s completely barking mad.

“We’re now scattered in a shallow meaningless way across northern towns where the only way for the troops to survive is to increase the level of violence so more people get killed. It’s pretty shocking and not something I want to be part of.”

---

This article should be mandatory reading for every one who believes that "might makes right".

Any bets our corporate media won't touch this story with a ten foot pole?

[ 10 September 2006: Message edited by: a lonely worker ]

The road to Kandahar

quote:

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It was the afternoon of March 21, 2005 — 48 hours before Prime Minister Paul Martin's first visit to the ranch with presidents George W. Bush and Vicente Fox in Waco, Texas.

Members of Martin's inner circle were filing into Room 323-S in Parliament's Centre Block, among them, freshly minted Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier,

Martin had called the meeting to discuss an array of foreign-policy issues.

But Hillier and planners in the defence department were fixed on one thing and one thing only: Afghanistan.

Three hours later, Hillier had won the room. Canadian soldiers would move from the relative comfort of Kabul to the pointy edge of combat in the turbulent south.

"There was a feeling that this was the price of being a G-8 country," recalls Scott Reid, formerly Martin's communications director. "It was a question of, you know, after having shown up all these years with a six-pack, whether we were finally going to tend bar."

And then, of course, there was the American angle.

"There was a fairly strong trail of orthodoxy," that ran through the foreign affairs bureaucracy, Reid says, "that was based on an evaluation of strategic interests in terms of our relationship with the United States. A lot of times policy was put to us based on, `This matters to this White House. And things that matter to this White House can't be taken lightly, because these guys take it personally ... So, we really have to evaluate the importance of making a decision that runs counter to this White House.'

"You cannot underestimate the desire of soldiers to prove themselves in combat," says Paul Heinbecker, a former foreign senior policy adviser under the Chrétien and Mulroney governments; nor of commanders to finally show their skill in managing real battlefields, he says.

"The United States, for a whole series of reasons, from exceptionalism to neo-conism to hubris to ignorance about the world, is conducting itself in a way that is creating a lot of enemies. And I just don't see how our association with that helps," he says.

In fact, he stresses, "it's endangering Canada."

---

Oh yeah we're there for all the right reasons!

quote:

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The number of casualties is alarming. Last weekend alone, Nato reported killing 200 militants near Kandahar.

Numbers are hard to verify as the Afghans immediately remove the bodies, and the total reported killed this summer comes to more than Nato’s own assessments of Taliban in the area. “We are killing far too many people,” says a top British military officer. “They can’t all be Taliban.”

“Before I went to Afghanistan I was excited, but our approach has been simplistic,” said Docherty. “We keep talking of Taliban to refer to the whole spectrum from the diehard militant to farmers.”

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quote:

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“All those people whose homes have been destroyed and sons killed are going to turn against the British,” he said. “It’s a pretty clear equation — if people are losing homes and poppy fields, they will go and fight. I certainly would.

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quote:

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Although, from a marketing perspective, if one wants to make sure that the conflict will endure for years to come, this is an excellent strategy to make it happen.

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Nearly every last tactic that has been reported on from Afghanistan appears to be ultimately aimed at increasing the strength of 'Taliban' (I quote 'Taliban' cause it's really difficult to even determine what the enemy is anymore). If continuation of conflict was a priority, we've definately suceeded there ^^

[ 11 September 2006: Message edited by: Noise ]

quote:

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I wouldn't call a Captain "Aide-de-Camp" a top soldier. Essentially an Aide-de-Camp is a luggage porter and boot polisher for the Generals.

---

That quote is directly from the Times.

Any person who is actually in the room where the decisions are made can speak with far more accuracy then someone else who merely receives the decision and then interprets it to their views.

Unfortunately as predicted no Canadian corporate source carried this story and when I tried referring to it in a Globe comments section about sending tanks to Afghanistan (to build schools?) it never saw the light of day.

[ 11 September 2006: Message edited by: a lonely worker ]

The rank of staff officers does not necessarily co-incide with their power, since they are ranked in relation to the senior officer under whom they serve. In this case, "former aide-de-camp to the commander of the British taskforce, carries weight.

In this case, rather than being a "boot polisher," this guy would as likely be someone who was not only at meetings but also be someone charged with actually communicating specific orders and ensuring that the commanders orders were carried out, at the very least he would be around.

People here don't actually think that the commander himself is on the phone all day recieving information and relaying instructions?

This isn't Napoleon at Austerlitz.

[ 11 September 2006: Message edited by: Cueball ]

Top soldier quits as campaign turns into 'pointless' war.

Some calssics from British soldier, retired and otherwise it seems:

quote:

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RAMC_Medic:
I'm not disagreeing with you there armchair_jihadi. We're only making matters worse by our presence there and how in Gods name an extra-small NATO force can be expected to pacify a country when neither the Soviets nor the Seppos could is beyond me.

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quote:

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armchair_jihad:
Its not so much that the previous visitors couldn't do it, its the woolyness of the mission that and the fact its a 20p version of what is needed. Relying on DFID to assist in winning hearts and minds is laughable

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quote:

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Yank_Lurker:
Uhhhh, right. So, let's flash back to October, 2001. The US says, "Hand over Osama and Al Quaeda". The Taliban says, "Go stuff yourselves, we'll continue to be a haven for terrorist training camps and recruitment." Your recommendation is that instead of bombing the crap out of Afghanistan, then going in, occupying, and attempting to reform, the US Government and NATO allies should instead have said, "Right, okay. Well, sorry for bothering you, carry on."

Since we made the "great mistake" of taking down the Taliban and wasting a bunch of terrorists, we should try to "Fix" things by pulling out post-haste, and letting the Taliban and Al Quaeda get back to their work of turning Afghanistan into a Muslim paradise, right?

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quote:

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armchair_jihad

incorrect reading of posts

what we lament is the fact that the mission is half assed, badly concieved and underfunded, a significant section of the NATO contribution is effectively pacifist (Germany). We want it done properly, now.

Yank Lurker do not turn this into a knee jerk 'oh this must be another anti American thread, attack, attack' response.

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quote:

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Its kinda like Babble, but with more acronyms.

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The real interesting thing is these are normally arch conservative types who post on these sites.

What next? The freak doms questioning the white stains on Harper's suit whenever he meets with the chimp?

[ 11 September 2006: Message edited by: a lonely worker ]

The Brits have made a total cockup of their operation and the Taliban can see an easier time against the blundering Brits than against the relentless careful combined arms approach of the Canadians.

Or,perhaps the Taliban are the only ones listening to Jack and are "bringing the troops home"

Now that NATO has won in the Panjwai area,they have to fulfil their promise to garrison the area and commit to civil aid projects.

This approach contrasts with the British Paras who barge about,get trapped by the Taliban and have to be constantly rescued.

[ 12 September 2006: Message edited by: jester ]

quote:

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Originally posted by jester:
Now that NATO has won in the Panjwai area,they have to fulfil their promise to garrison the area and commit to civil aid projects.

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quote:

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Originally posted by Cueball:
Exactly an Aide de Camp, in the form of a Captain can be a very formidble officer on a general staff. For instance he might be an important liason officer. The rank of staff officers does not necessarily co-incide with their power, since they are ranked in relation to the senior officer under whom they serve. In this case, "former aide-de-camp to the commander of the British taskforce, carries weight.[ 11 September 2006: Message edited by: Cueball ]

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Having myself been on the staff of High Command Level HQs, there are specific functions performed by various officers. An Executive Assistant to the General in charge would be at the LCol or Col level. These people would sit in on the meetings and perhaps draft communiques for the General to authorize release down to subordinate units, and perhaps follow up on actions taken. In my experience, an aide-de-camp never sits in on decision making processes or monitors for the General compliance of orders, or formulates policy for that matter. He supervises the arrangement of the General's travel, hotels, dry cleaning, schedule, etc. Often he performs these tasks personally. Something like a valet. I think the central question as regards to this thread, is what can be derived from a staff officer quitting the Afghan mission? Is it a sign of pervasive doubt about the mission at the HQ? In my estimation and experience, one can become disgruntled in that particular job without external circumstances weighing in. Having said that, we should be careful to read too much into it from the headline of "Top Soldier." From that, people could be left with the impression that the HQ of the British force in Afghanistan is falling apart from within, over questions about the mission. In this case, an aide-de-camp to a Col is even lower down the scale.

[ 12 September 2006: Message edited by: Slumberjack ]

quote:

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Originally posted by unionist:

Well that'll be the day

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quote:

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Originally posted by jester:
Interesting point in the Globe article on Op Medusa today Insurgents Melt Away From Battle that many of the Taliban who bugged out of Panjwai headed west to Helmand province.

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Pitching this as anything like the "victory" as described by the Globe and Mail in terms like, "scattered from a grinding Canadian military advance in Panjwai district, as soldiers punched into a former Taliban stronghold in a cascade of dust and flying rubble," might make good Hardy Boys time adventure copy, but it is glib fantasy, really.

They left, they killed a few Canadians, and there was a terribly demoralizing friendly fire incident. A job well done as far as the Pashtu fighters are concerned.

They will be back.

quote:

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The Brits have made a total cockup of their operation and the Taliban can see an easier time against the blundering Brits than against the relentless careful combined arms approach of the Canadians.

Or,perhaps the Taliban are the only ones listening to Jack and are "bringing the troops home"

Now that NATO has won in the Panjwai area,they have to fulfil their promise to garrison the area and commit to civil aid projects.

This approach contrasts with the British Paras who barge about,get trapped by the Taliban and have to be constantly rescued.

---

Blundering Brits? Relentless Canadians? Is that what the Military Channel is teaching you chickenhawks these days?

You do realise that this is the third times NATO has retaken the same district in just the past two years? You might call that relentless ... I call it pointless.

quote:

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They will be back.

Trying to pitch the enemy melting away, after it was supposedly "trapped" and about to be anihilated sounds pretty bad to me.

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You got that right. Weren't the Taliban trapped and annilhated in 2001?

Obviously people have forgotten the tactics of guerrilla warfare.

One of the greatest of all time was Che himself. This is what Che wrote in October 1960:

quote:

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The foregoing should be considered an introduction to the explanation of this curious phenomenon that has intrigued the entire world: the Cuban Revolution. It is a deed worthy of study in contemporary world history: the how and the why of a group of men who, shattered by an army enormously superior in technique and equipment, managed first to survive, soon became strong, later became stronger than the enemy in the battle zones, still later moved into new zones of combat, and finally defeated that enemy on the battlefield even though their troops were still very inferior in number.

After the landing comes the defeat, the almost total destruction of the forces, and their regrouping and integration as guerrillas. Characteristic of those few survivors, imbued with the spirit of struggle, was the understanding that to count upon spontaneous outbursts throughout the island was a falsehood, an illusion. They understood also that the fight would have to be a long one and that it would need vast campesino participation. At this point, the campesinos entered the guerrilla war for the first time.

Two events - hardly important in terms of the number of combatants, but of great psychological value - were unleashed. First, antagonism that the city people, who comprised the central guerrilla group, felt towards the campesinos was erased. The campesinos, in turn, distrusted the group and, above all, feared barbarous reprisals of the government. Two things demonstrated themselves at this stage, both very important for the interrelated factors: To the campesinos, the bestialities of the army and all the persecution would not be sufficient to put an end to the guerrilla war, even though the army was certainly capable of liquidating the campesinos' homes, crops, and families. To take refuge with those in hiding was a good solution. In turn, the guerrilla fighters learned the necessity, each time more pointed, of winning the campesino masses. . . .

[Following the failure of Batista's major assault on the Rebel Army,] the war shows a new characteristic: The correlation of forces turns toward the revolution. Within a month and a half, two small columns, one of eighty and the other of a hundred forty men, constantly surrounded and harassed by an army that mobilised thousands of soldiers, crossed the plains of Camagüey, arrived at Las Villas, and began the job of cutting the island in two.

It may seem strange, incomprehensible, and even incredible that two columns of such small size - without communications, without mobility, without the most elementary arms of modern warfare - could fight against well-trained, and above all, well-armed troops.

Basic [to the victory] is the characteristic of each group: the fewer comforts the guerrilla fighter has, the more he is initiated into the rigors of nature, the more he feels himself at home; his morale is higher, his sense of security greater. At the same time, he has learned to risk his life in every circumstance that might arise, to trust it to luck, like a tossed coin; and in general, as a final result of this kind of combat, it matters little to the individual guerrilla whether or not he survives.

The enemy soldier in the Cuban example, which we are now considering, is the junior partner of the dictator; he is the man who gets the last crumbs left to him in a long line of profiteers that begins in Wall Street and ends with him. He is disposed to defend his privileges, but he is disposed to defend them only to the degree that they are important to him. His salary and pension are worth some suffering and some dangers, but they are never worth his life; if the price of maintaining them will cost it, he is better off giving them up, that is to say, withdrawing from the face of guerrilla danger. From these two concepts and these two morals springs the difference which would cause the crisis of December 31, 1958 .

---

Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution

Everytime we level a village, burn a farmer's crop, kill a family member we create another generation of guerrillas. Contrary to our militray propaganda, these are no victories but will only hasten the day we regret our desire to be the chimp's banana holder.

Another lesson never heard from on the chickenhawk channel.

[ 12 September 2006: Message edited by: a lonely worker ]

This topic is about the Brits in Afghanistan,not Cuban commies.I didn't bother with your handwringing rant but being informed on military matters is not the same as approving them.

Never depress a main gun without checking for the SSM's whiskey first. Theres some useful info for you,chickenlittle.

[ 13 September 2006: Message edited by: jester ]

[ 13 September 2006: Message edited by: jester ]

[ 13 September 2006: Message edited by: jester ]

People who have led succesful guerilla armies, are almost always indiginous to the country where they fought. People like Mao and Ho Chi Minh, the FSLN are good examples. It is essential that you have a political base, above and beyond an ideological point of view that has populist appeal.

Politics is at the heart of succesful guerilla war strategies, understanding this was essential element of Guerilla war that Che failed to appreciate.

[ 13 September 2006: Message edited by: Cueball ]

quote:

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Originally posted by Cueball:

Politics is at the heart of succesful guerilla war strategies, understanding this was essential element of Guerilla war that Che failed to appreciate.

[ 13 September 2006: Message edited by: Cueball ]

---

I think South American's have not embraced American values after all these years since the CIA's operation condor to prevent 'domino effect.' I think very few people remember Bolivian president Barrientos or the U.S.-backed thugs who killed Che.

Che was the penultimate revolutionary who made the greatest sacrifice of all for what he believed in. And I think it is Che's sacrifice and memory that are burned into the hearts and minds of Bolivian's today.

While President Musharrif publically espouses support for western efforts in Afghanistan and there are an endless stream of announcements by Pakistani authorities on their efforts,the reality is that Musharrif is in power due to the support of Pakistani elements that control the Taliban.

The quid pro quo of this arrangement is that Musharrif not interfere with the Taliban.

A Pakistani military operation that killed JWP President Nawar Akbar Bugti in Balochistan has required an increased security presence in the Quetta border area but this presence will not interfere with Taliban operations,it will focus on Balochistan counter insurgency.

The new agreement in Waziristan likewise will allow Pakistan to monitor its border with Afghanistan but again to prevent Afghan retaliation,not to prevent Taliban insurgency.

The Taliban hold all the political cards.Militarily,their low tech insurgency is no match for western armour.

What intrigues me is why the Taliban can't access more sophisticated RPGs capable of breaching armour? With the backing of their political masters in Pakistan,it is surprising that they do not have any anti-armour capacity.

"Low tech" is what the Vietnamese used against American (and Canadian) troops in the 1960's and 70's ie. camouflaging pits with pungy sticks, booby traps and hit and run in general. The Taliban had access to SAM and stinger missiles. They were surrendering to the "Northern Alliance" in pickup trucks, Jeeps, and apparently, they had tanks themselves. I think the American-made Abrams tanks were better suited for places like Iraq than for chasing Taliban through mountainous terrain.

[ 13 September 2006: Message edited by: Fidel ]

quote:

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Originally posted by Fidel:

I think South American's have not embraced American values after all these years since the CIA's operation condor to prevent 'domino effect.' I think very few people remember Bolivian president Barrientos or the U.S.-backed thugs who killed Che.

Che was the penultimate revolutionary who made the greatest sacrifice of all for what he believed in. And I think it is Che's sacrifice and memory that are burned into the hearts and minds of Bolivian's today.

Viva la revolucion!

---

Good revolutionaries don't get involved in fondering revolts, with little basis in the popular will so that they can be betrayed by their so called allies and then assassinated by the CIA.

quote:

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Originally posted by jester:

The Taliban hold all the political cards.Militarily,their low tech insurgency is no match for western armour.

---

Infantry is the key to this fight, unless of course you are talking about a scorched earth arial campaign.

Your faith in the Canadian armour is as mislplaced as Fidel's adoration of Che's military skills, here is why:

Tanks, in their most useful formulation add extra punch when trying to break an enemy line, and then (theoretically) exploit that opening. The Taliban don't have any front line, so what are they good for?

Plus this is a highly amorphous military situation, with engagemtns fought scatered hither and thither of often inhospitable terrain. Are they actually going to drive these buggers to each an every engagement? Don't they have to be transported to the front?

At best these tanks will end up as point vehicle on convoy duty (slows everything down of course) or be used as static reinforced artillery posts in fixed positions.

Unless of course the buzz is that there might be action on the Iranian border, in which case they might serve some purpose.

[ 13 September 2006: Message edited by: Cueball ]

quote:

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Originally posted by Cueball:

Good revolutionaries don't get involved in fondering revolts, with little basis in the popular will so that they can be betrayed by their so called allies and then assassinated by the CIA.

---

Che is a revolutionary icon around the world today whereas the scum of the earth who caused his demise are as forgotten about as the rest of the U.S.-backed Skool of the America's graduates who cast shadows on Latin America.

Che had a heart and soul, and he definitely was a bright young man. He was idealistic. Che was a doctor. The worms chopped his fucking hands off.

Even among Latin Americans he is far outstripped by the like of Castro Tomas Borges, Daniel Ortega and Regis Debray. He never said anything really interesting about guerilla war, nor anything particularly unique or very witty about politics.

[ 13 September 2006: Message edited by: Cueball ]

Donald "the Don" Rumsfeld announced increased U.S. aid for Latin America's militaries a number of months ago. It's not intended to prevent an invasion by the Sovietsky's, Cueball.

Nobody cared where CIA pawn Jonas Savimbi's body was buried. Angolan's let the sonofabitch's corpse rot in the streets.

[ 13 September 2006: Message edited by: Fidel ]

quote:

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Originally posted by Fidel:
Allende should have armed the workers as they demanded. He could have been alive today

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quote:

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the reality is that Musharrif is in power due to the support of Pakistani elements that control the Taliban

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quote:

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One of the first principles of guerrilla war is being being politically connected to the people. His expedition into Bolivia was madness, and he paid the price.

People who have led succesful guerilla armies, are almost always indiginous to the country where they fought. People like Mao and Ho Chi Minh, the FSLN are good examples. It is essential that you have a political base, above and beyond an ideological point of view that has populist appeal.

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Did you even read the quote? It's about the Cuban revolution and the nature of Cuban guerrilla warfare NOT Bolivia's (that's another debate).

I can tell you didn't even read it because Che writes about it:

quote:

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Characteristic of those few survivors, imbued with the spirit of struggle, was the understanding that to count upon spontaneous outbursts throughout the island was a falsehood, an illusion. They understood also that the fight would have to be a long one and that it would need vast campesino participation. At this point, the campesinos entered the guerrilla war for the first time.

---

You simply paraphrase the same point but obviously your issue is with the writer and not the subject.

You talk about building an idealogical base and having a populist appeal yet forget that Che's writings and example of self sacrifice are part of forming that very base.

That is why Che's image still appears at the front of virtually every revolutionary and guerrilla movement and NOT Regis Denbry's for good reason:

quote:

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Act 2: Diplomatic coercion

On the French side, the operation was supervised by Régis Debray and Véronique Albanel. The latter is listed as president of the "Universal Brotherhood" which carries out charitable action in Haïti, linked with the Catholic Church. Albanel is also the sister of Dominique Galouzeau de Villepin, wife of France's foreign secretary de Villepin, and the wife of French airforce general Baudoin Albanel.

On December 17, 2003, at 3 pm, Regis Debray showed up at the presidential palace to demand that elected president Jean-Bernard Aristide resign. This was refused, and was followed a few days later by the public release by Debray and Villepin-Albanel of their report to Foreign secretary Dominique de Villepin. The report noted: "Let us not fool ourselves. The resignation of President Aristide will not make the country more prosperous overnight, nor will it make it more productive." (p. 35). "Many persons imagine rivalry exists where there is in fact complementarity [i.e. between the USA. and France], and though our means of influence are not the same, they can and must add up, for the good of Haiti. It may be the [French] President's task, or at least the Foreign Affairs Minister's, to define from the beginning, at the best level, the methods and spirit of this combination. A stronger implication [by France] in Haïti could indeed not run against the interests of the United States, but should operate in a well-balanced and cautious spirit." (p. 52).

To sum up, the goal was to overthrow Aristide to defend the common interests of a large American empire and a small French empire.

The United States and France put pressure on various Caribbean and Latin American states to not take part in the the 200th anniversary ceremonies of the "first Negro republic of America" [8], held on 1 January, 2004, in Port-au-Prince. Only South African president Thabo Mbeki defied the great powers by attending it.

---

Washington and Paris Overthrow Aristide

Obviously he has forgotten the first REAL issue of a revolutionary: know who the enemy is and don't side with them against the people.

Back to the thread, the only reason that I posted Che's quote is that aside from who wrote it, our actions are creating the same effect on the Afghans as the US / Batista thugs had on the Cubans. That's why the occupiers will never win.

[ 13 September 2006: Message edited by: a lonely worker ]

quote:

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Originally posted by unionist:

Well, he would have turned 98 on July 26, Fidel. But in my heart, Allende will live forever.

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quote:

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Your faith in the Canadian armour is as mislplaced as Fidel's adoration of Che's military skills, here is why:

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I don't think "faith" is the right word. I just posted on my opinion of MBTs in the quagmire thread.Basically,MBTs are operated in a combined arms environment and if they are not,they become vulnerable.

Since it is doubtful that the Taliban will attempt a linear engagement again,it is probably not worthwhile to deploy Leopards.

The Aussies are not replacing their SAS and commando SF elements at the end of the current rotation,the Dutch will not undertake any mission except force protection,leaving only the Brits,Americans and Canadians involved in offensive operations.

The Brits are rotating Royal Marines in,both mountain troops and SF commandos.What purpose will it serve for Canada to create a third generation manoevre combat team for a fourth generation insurgency?

quote:

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Originally posted by a lonely worker:

Musharraf is an American puppet and will stay in power as long as they have use for him (like Saddam and Noriega). Judging by the amount of right winged sheep who now thinking he's a taliban stooge, one can only assume his time of usefulness is coming to an end.

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Anyone who considers Musharrif an American puppet or a Taliban stooge knows nothing of Pakistan.

Musharrif's tenuous hold on power is a balancing act.As both head of state and head of the military,there are calls for him to choose one or the other.

He has acquired the conditional support of fundamentalists and this limits his ability to respond to American demands regarding the Taliban.That is if his public support for the American position has any legitimacy.

If he is an American puppet,he sold out really cheap because he can't even pry parking meter change out of the genius's administration.

quote:

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Originally posted by Cueball:
Your faith in the Canadian armour is as mislplaced as Fidel's adoration of Che's military skills, here is why:

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"Know this - you are killing a man."

quote:

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Originally posted by jester:

Anyone who considers Musharrif an American puppet or a Taliban stooge knows nothing of Pakistan.

Musharrif's tenuous hold on power is a balancing act.As both head of state and head of the military,there are calls for him to choose one or the other.

---

quote:

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Originally posted by Fidel:

"Know this - you are killing a man."

And this from someone who thought that Dauod Khan, his sycophantic government caucus and Shah of Iran were planning social democracy for Afghanistan. pfff!

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quote:

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Originally posted by jester:

Anyone who considers Musharrif an American puppet or a Taliban stooge knows nothing of Pakistan.

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Precisely, not exactly a "stooge," more like a pin cushion.

When Colin Powell originally sent the US airforce to Pakistan in 2001 to back up the land invasion of Afghanistan, he didn't "ask" if he could come, he more or less said: "We are bringing the US airforce to Pakistan one way or the other. How do you want it delivered?"

So, in a sense Powell did "ask" a question with limited options, and Musharaf demured on the least savory of the two.

That is the way I see it.

[ 14 September 2006: Message edited by: Cueball ]

quote:

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Originally posted by Cueball:

My point was simply that Dauod Khan and sycophantic government caucus were miles ahead on rights and social progress issues than Karmal's disorganized and blatantly undemocratic coupe (which he couldn't even pull off himself without an armed contingent of Sviets Speical forces backing him up) or the Red Armies imposition of martial law.

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From what I can tell, Daud, with the aid of Marxists and moderates, overthrew his cousin, the King Zahir, citing corruption and repressive rule.

But then, Daud Kahn began moving Afghanistan away from socialism - became more corrupt and repressive than Zahir. Lefist factions began to realize that reforms just weren't happening with Daud and his cabinet of sycophants.

The Soviet-leaning Marxists began to question Daud's actions, like allowing the U.S. to erect military radar installations to spy on the Soviets.

And as I pointed out to you before, the UNESCO education reforms were designed to steer Afghani children away from pursusing high school education. You stated that Daud's cabinet of sycophants weren't given enough time to build networks of railroads cross-crossing Afghanistan, and that the corrupt Shah of Iran's word was his bond in promising to fund the massive project.