thread drift from a thread about Lebanon.

Operation August Storm refers to the Soviet defeat of Imperial Japan in Manchuria - the last battles of WW2. There was some debate I was involved in in the other thread on Lebanon.

A quick read shows that this topic is worthy of careful study. Even US military historians think so...

Ausust Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria

The US author is full of admiration for the creative and audacious campaign by the Soviets in this conflict. Apparently, much was prepared in secret including an audacious movement of troops across the inpenetrable eastern desert of Mongolia.

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Answers.com: Operation August Storm, along with the two atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, combined to break the Japanese political deadlock and force Japan's surrender; they made it clear that Japan had no hope of holding out, even in the Home Islands.

Soviet-occupied Manchuria would also provide the main base of operations for Mao Zedong's forces, who proved victorious in the following four years of civil war in China. In fact, military success in Manchuria prevented the Soviet Union from receiving bases in China—promised by the Western allies—because all land gained was turned over to the People's Republic of China after they gained power.

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It's also worth mentioning that the conduct and intentions of the Japanese authorities is sometimes difficult to unravel for those last months of the war. I would compare it to the conduct of politicians that want one group to think one thing and others to think something else - it was a clever strategy of mis-leading others; don't forget that the initial reaction of Japan to the Potsdam declaration was to ignore it by silence. Furthermore, the intentions of the different Japanese authorities [the Emperor, the civil authorities, the military authorities, etc.] were sometimes in conflict; there was, in fact, danger of a coup d'etat in August of 1945. Some of those authorities would have continued the war in one form or another. They needed to be forced to see that unconditional surrender was the only way forward. Some of the Japanese authorities were, I think, as much afraid of insurrection and overthrow of the Emperor system as they were of military defeat. But it is not clear to me that those views would prevail without the defeat in Manchuria.

The Japanese authorities knew very well that the US had only a few, one or two at most, nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the orthodox bombing of Tokyo killed a sizable fraction of those killed by the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, don't forget. The use of a couple of nuclear weapons did nothing to weaken the Japanese armies in Manchuria. On the one hand, said some, the Japanese would stop at nothing, uncluding military strategy based in part on suicide [Kamikaze, etc.] to resist the Allies; on the other hand, say the same people, the use of two nuclear weapons managed to persuade the Japanese to surrender. Contradiction? Until the Allies convinced the Russians to join the War in the Pacific, the Soviets had a treaty with Japan and, in fact, Japan fully expected the Soviets to represent their views at Potsdam. The argument could be made that it was the Soviet entry into the Pacific war and not the use of nuclear weapons that cinched the Allied victory.

Of course, invading Manchuria and defeating the Japanese Kwantung army helped the Chinese Communists then led by Mao Zedong. And the Soviets can't have been ignorant of that. The Soviets got their Pacific port and the Chinese got a base from which to develop their revolutionary movement. The Soviets also got back Sakhalin Island and other territory occupied by Japan since 1905.

Edited to add: I would be remiss if I did not mention another aspect - revenge. Just as revenge, I think, played a role in the unnecesary use of nuclear weapons by the US so too, I think, the Soviets wanted to strike back for the humiliating defeat of 1905 in which virtually the entire Russian fleet was wiped out by Japan. The Soviets probably remembered that shame from 40 years earlier.

What if? There were entire armies involved in the conflict dubbed Operation August Storm. Couldn't those who commanded these armies also decide to capitulate if they wanted to? Why didn't they?

The terrible war atrocities of the Japanese militarists in Asia, against Allied, including Canadian troops, are infamous. As it is, they were not prosecuted for those crimes. What if they had been allowed to have a base of operations on the Asian mainland? China might still be an autocracy and women still have their feet bound.

Why should the Soviets have risked continued Japanese occupation in Manchuria? No, I think they had to defeat them militarily... just as the Nazis had to be militarily defeated and Germany prevented from unleashing war again.

Edited to add: I've edited this contribution more than once. I hope it's more coherent as a result.

[ 24 August 2006: Message edited by: N.Beltov ]

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So I think it's not too much of a stretch for the Soviets to assume that the US and other non-Soviet members of the Allied forces in the Pacific would have been willing to leave the Japanese militarists in Manchuria just as the Emperor system was left alone in Japan, as Japanese War Criminals were NOT prosecuted after the war, etc..

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The terms of the Potsdam declaration, which Japan agreed to on August 15, specified that Japan would yield all overseas territory and bring its armies home. Manchuria would not have been left in Japanese hands in any surrender scenario.

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Some of the Japanese authorities were, I think, as much afraid of insurrection and overthrow of the Emperor system as they were of military defeat. But it is not clear to me that those views would prevail without the defeat in Manchuria.

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While that's possibly valid, I hardly think it was the motivation for the Soviet attack.

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The Japanese authorities knew very well that the US had only a few, one or two at most, nuclear weapons.

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Pardon me? How did the Japanese know this? I have never seen any indication they had any hint of the existence of atomic weaponry until several hours after Hiroshima was destroyed.

Also, on your point about firebombings having only marginally less of an effect, the point of the bombings was to suggest what would happen if such a bomb was dropped on a larger Japanese population center, such as Tokyo.

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Just as revenge, I think, played a role in the unnecesary use of nuclear weapons by the US so too, I think, the Soviets wanted to strike back for the humiliating defeat of 1905 in which virtually the entire Russian fleet was wiped out by Japan. The Soviets probably remembered that shame from 40 years earlier.

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It's a stretch to think Stalin cared all that much about the destruction of a Czarist Russian fleet 40 years earlier. Another flaw with that argument is that the Soviets signed the 1941 peace agreement with Japan in the first place (and this was before the Germans invaded), to last 5 years and automatically renew for another 5 years if neither country opted out. It was clear after Khalkin-Gol in 1939 that the Soviets had superior land forces, but they didn't seem the least bit inclined to enter the East Asian war that was ongoing.